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Abstract—An excellent self-driving car is expected to take
its passengers safely and efficiently from one place to another.
However, different ways of defining safety and efficiency may
significantly affect the conclusion we make. In this paper, we
give formal definitions to the safe state of a road and safe state
of a vehicle using the syntax of linear temporal logic (LTL).
We then propose the concept of safe driving throughput (SDT)
and safe driving capacity (SDC) which measure the amount of
vehicles in the safe state on a road. We analyze how SDT is
affected by different factors. We show the analytic difference of
SDC between the road with perception-based vehicles (PBV) and
the road with cooperative-based vehicles (CBV). We claim that
through proper design, the SDC of the road filled with PBVs will
be upper-bounded by the SDC of the road filled with CBVs.
Index Terms—Self-driving Car, Safe Drivings, Cooperative
Communications, V2V, Vehicular Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-driving car has been regarded as the solution to current
transportation problems and has obtained significant improve-
ment in recent years. Nevertheless, from the recent self-driving
car accidents, people understand that safety remains an issue.
From car A shown in Figure. 1, it is clear that safety in
the sense of collision cannot be guaranteed. The way to
circumvent this problem is to redefine the meaning of safe.
Shalev-Shwartz et al. define the safe in the sense of whether
to share responsibility in an accident [1]. We adopt this idea of
safe and create rules and definitions with mathematical rigors
using LTL, the logic syntax often used in fields like automaton
and control system to describe their concurrent characteristics
with greater precision [2, 3, 4].
A
Fig. 1: Absolute safety is not possible
Based on our definitions, we propose the concept of safe
driving throughput (SDT) and safe driving capacity (SDC).
SDT and SDC have more practical uses than the throughput
defined conventionally since it guarantees the vehicles being
calculated to be blame-free under a lowest speed limit. We
analyze various factors that could have impacts on them by
studying the longitudinal distance between vehicles. There
were several related studies concerning the effects of longi-
tudinal distance; [5] focuses on how it affects the stability of
platoons and [6] focuses on passenger comfort affected by it.
There were also several studies about rear-end collisions; [7]
focuses on the role the response of agents play and [8] studies
the relation between the warning system and the collisions.
We aim to study how longitudinal distance affects rear-end
collisions under the safe driving presumptions.
The contributions of this paper are twofold.
1) We formalize the concept of safe in the sense of respon-
sibility using the LTL syntax. Based on it, we propose
the concept of SDT and SDC that take both efficiency
and safety into consideration.
2) We show the fundamental differences between PBV and
CBV by analyzing their SDC and present a protocol that
could achieve such capacity.
We organize the paper as follows. Section II describes
assumptions used in this paper and gives definitions needed
in the following contexts, followed by our proposed protocol
and detailed analysis on the SDC gain it brings to the road
comparing to the case which the road is filled with PBVs
in Section III. In Section IV, we show the analytic result by
figures and discuss them. In Section V, we conclude our work
and point out related open issues.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
A. Assumptions
1) Vehicle Requirements: All the vehicles we discuss are
equipped with a high precision mapping system, navigation
system, full autonomous controller, complete perception sys-
tem, wireless interfaces for communication and high accuracy
positioning system. The perception system consists of different
types of sensors such as LIDAR, camera, and radar in charge
of sensing the parameters of the car in front [9]. The wireless
communication interface allows the vehicle to use any of the
wireless technology including cellular interfaces like 4G/5G
and DSRC [10, 11].
2) Homogeneous: All the vehicles are autonomous vehi-
cles equipped with requirements mentioned above.
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3) Reliable: All the messages from other vehicles are
presumed to be reliable.
4) Road Requirements: All the vehicles are running on a
straight road without any intersection and merging point.
B. Formalization and Definitions
In this subsection, we give definitions needed to define the
safe driving throughput and safe driving capacity. For mathe-
matical rigors, the syntax of LTL is used to help formalizing
some of the definitions. In the following context, we assume
that there are N vehicles ω1, ω2, ...ωN on the road R, that is,
Ω(R) = N . Every vehicle ωi has its own finite sequence of
states σi =< si1, si2, ..., siT >. The subscript T denotes the
time horizon we care about and it should be system-dependent.
The predicate C(ωi) is true iff ωi collides with any other
vehicle ωj|j 6=i and the predicate Υ(ωi) is true iff ωi shares
responsibility in an accident if any happens.
Definition 1: Longitudinal Distance:
The longitudinal distance of two cars is the distance between
their body center measured along the direction of the road.
Definition 2: best effort reaction(BER):
The best effort reaction (BER) of a car is to apply max braking
power along the direction of the road until the car halts.
Definition 3: Safe Longitudinal Distance:
Two vehicles are in safe longitudinal distance if ωf , the one
in front, makes a sudden change of behavior, the longitudinal
distance between them is still sufficient for ωr, the one behind,
to react and not bump into ωf . If even applying BER cannot
prevent ωr from the collision, such distance is unsafe.
Definition 4: Safe State of a Vehicle ω:
A vehicle ω is in a safe state iff performing BER could spare
it from responsibility even when an accident happens.
∀i ∈ Ω(R); ωi is in the safe state
⇔ (σi, t) |= G[0,T ](BER⇒ ((C(ωi)⇒ ¬Υ(ωi)) ∨ ¬C(ωi))
≡ (σi, t) |= G[0,T ](BER ⇒ ¬Υ(ωi))
(1)
Definition 5: Safe State of a Road R:
A road R with N vehicles is in the safe state iff all the vehicles
running on it are in safe state.
R ∈ safe state⇔ ∀i ∈ Ω(R), ωi is in the safe state
≡ ∀ωi ∈ R, (σi, t) |= ¬F[0,T ](BER⇒ Υ(ωi))
(2)
Definition 6: Safe Driving Throughput (SDT) of a road R:
The safe driving throughput of R is the number of vehicles in
the safe state that are on R. Noted that SDT(R) ≤ Ω(R) and
if the road R is in safe state ⇒ SDT (R) = Ω(R).
Definition 7: Conservative Observation:
One observation is more conservative than another if the
decision made based on it makes the vehicle more probable
to stay in the safe state. We define the function Λ(M) which
takes observation metrics set M as input and return the most
conservative one among the set as output.
Λ(M) =
Mensemble + argmin{B}, if M ∈ {Vf}
Mensemble + argmax{B}, if M ∈ {amaxbrake, L, τ}
(3)
Here Mensemble is the ensemble average of all the observa-
tions and B is the set of all the biases of perception system.
Definition 8: Inaccuracy of Metrics: Inaccuracy of metrics
M due to the perception system is defined as:
Φ(M) :=
|∆M |
Λ(M)
(4)
So that we have:
Φ(M) =
|Mactual − Λ(M)|
Λ(M)
=
∣∣∣∣1− MactualΛ(M)
∣∣∣∣ = |1− eM |
(5)
As shown above, the deviation of a metrics M, eM , is defined
as the ratio of its actual value and its most conservative
estimate. We expect a good perception system to have Φ(M) ≤
5%, i.e., 0.95 ≤ eM ≤ 1.05.
Definition 9: Safe Driving Capacity (SDC):
We define the safe driving capacity of a road as the number
of vehicles on an M-kilometer-N-lane-straight-road requiring
every vehicle to be in the safe state and runs at least V km/hr.
We use the default values M=10, N=2, and V=100 unless
otherwise specified and denote it as SDC(10,2,100).
Definition 10: Perception-based vehicle (PBV):
A perception-based vehicle is a vehicle that makes decisions
based only on the data obtained from its perception system.
Definition 11: Cooperative-based vehicle (CBV):
A cooperative-based vehicle is a vehicle that makes decisions
mainly based on the data obtained through inter-vehicular
communication. Fig. 2 shows the difference between roads with
PBVs in definition 10 and road with CBVs in definition 11.
Fig. 2: Traffic with and without inter-vehicle communication.
III. DERIVATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROTOCOL
A. SDC analysis on road with PBVs
Based on the definitions in Section II, we derive the formula
of safe longitudinal distance between two vehicles with the
variables given in TABLE I. For simplicity, We define:
Tr = τ +
Vr τ(η) max
amaxbrake
(6)
Tf =
Vf
amaxbrake
(7)
Vr τ(η) max = Vr + τ(η)amaxacc (8)
Here Tr stands for the time elapsed from the moment it
detects a sudden full brake from the car in front till the time
Vr = 0. Tf is the time for the front car to enter full stop
from its original speed, i.e. the time Vf → 0. Vr τ max is the
maximum velocity the rear car could after the entire response
time τ . With these derived variables, the safe longitudinal
distance is given as:
if Tf < Tr :
DLongitudinal−safe = L+
1
2
(Vr + Vr τ(η) max)τ(η)
+
1
2
(Tr − τ(η))Vr τ(η) max − 1
2
VfTf
if Tf ≥ Tr :
DLongitudinal−safe = L
(9)
Proof of equation.9: For Tf ≥ Tr, the proof is trivial if we
presume both their speed drop at constant rate amaxbrake since
it’ll take longer for the front car to halt.
For Tf < Tr, Let dTr denote the distance between two
vehicles at time Tr. Then
dTr =
1
2
τ(η)
2
amaxbrake +
1
2
τ(η)(Vr τ(η) max − Vr)
+ d0 + Tf
[(
vf − vr τ(η) max
)− τ(η)amaxbrake]
− 1
2
(Tr − Tf )
(
vr τ(η) max − (Tf − τ(η)) amaxbrake
)
(10)
As long as two cars are still moving after t seconds where
t > τ(η), the first four terms on the right-hand side of equation
10 will be dTf , meaning the distance between two vehicles
after Tf . The last term in equation 10 means the distance
moved by the rear car from time Tf to Tr. Now it only
requires dTr > L, we can make sure two cars won’t collide.
By rearranging the terms, we conclude the proof.
B. Cooperative protocol
In this subsection, we propose a protocol that allows the
road with CBVs to achieve its maximum SDT, i.e., SDC.
C. SDC analysis on road with CBVs running Algorithm 1
The accuracy of Vf , amaxbrake , L and τ(η) could be
enhanced by the cooperative inter-vehicle communication.
And since the delay is additive, we have
τ(η) = τ0 + η (11)
Here τ0 denotes the time from the point ωr receives in-
formation from ωf till its system starts to brake. To show the
clear contrast to the result from road with PBVs, we denote all
the variables with subscript C as the actual value corrected by
Algorithm 1 Cooperative Protocol
while The car is still driving do
Send request to the front car ωf for Information
if Receive response then
Adjust distance according to the response
else
if No response but perception system works then
Adjust distance based on Λ(M)
where M ∈ perception observations
else
Adjust distance according to the most
conservative arguments predefined
end if
end if
end while
communication. By definition of inaccuracy of metrics defined
in Section II, we have:
eL = 1− Φ(L) = LC/L (12)
eVf = 1 + Φ(Vf ) = VfC/Vf (13)
ebrake = 1− Φ(brake) = amaxbrakeC/amaxbrake (14)
eτ = 1− Φ(τ) = τC/τ0 (15)
Noted that if the deviations eL, eVf , ebrake and eτ are
all 1, it means the PBVs perceive the actual value of all
the vehicle arguments needed. Also noted that η is not
affected by τC . By the same procedure in subsection A:
Vr τ max C = V r+ (eττ0 +η)ar max acc ; TrC = eττ0 +η+
Vr τ max C/amaxbrake, and TfC = VfC/amaxbrakeC . Using
these variables, the communication-corrected version of safe
longitudinal distance Dcorrected will be (L + eL)/2 for the
trivial case Tf ≥ Tr ; for the case Tf < Tr,
Dcorrected =
1
2
{(L+ LeL)− (VfCTfC)
+ (Vr + Vr τ max C)(eττ0 + η) +
V 2r τ max C
amaxbrake
}
(16)
Lemma 1: If for any metrics M , Λ(M) is always more
conservative than its actual value, the estimation of the safe
longitudinal distance of CBVs is less or equal to the one of
PBVs:
Dcorrected ≤ DLongitudinal safe
Proof of Lemma 1:
It’s the direct consequence of definition 5 and definition 6.
Lemma 2: Let E{X} denote the expected value of variable
X, The SDC of a road R with PBVs is given as:
SDC(R(PBV )) = b N(M − L)
Eωi|∀i∈Ω(R){Dlongitudinal safe}
c+ 1
Lemma 3: The SDC of a road R with CBVs is given as:
SDC(R(CBV )) = b N(M − LC)
Eωi|∀i∈Ω(R){DCorrected}
c+ 1
Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3: The (M − L) term in
the fractions denotes the distance from the center of the first
vehicle to the center of the last vehicle. Since all the vehicles
are asked to keep at least Dlongitudinal safe from the vehicles
in their front, we have b (M−L)Eωi|∀i∈Ω(R){Dlongitudinal safe}c inter-
vehicle spaces. This implies that a single lane can accom-
modate b (M−L)Eωi|∀i∈Ω(R){Dlongitudinal safe}c+ 1 vehicles. Proof of
Lemma 3 is identical to Lemma 2.
Theorem 1: The SDC(R(PBV )) is upper bounded by the
SDC(R(CBV using our protocol)) if Λ(M) is always more
conservative than actual M for any metrics M .
SDC(R(PBV )) ≤ SDC(R(CBV ))
Proof of Theorem 1: Since Λ(M) is always more conservative
than actual M , 0 ≤ E{LC} ≤ E{L}, and from Lemma 1, we
have 0 ≤ Dcorrected ≤ DLongitudinal safe. Based on these
two inequalities, we complete the proof.
IV. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
For a vehicle equipped with ABS (Anti-lock brake sys-
tem), at the speed of 100 km/h, the maximum acceleration
and deceleration are 2.2 to 4.0 m/s2 and around 9 m/s2
respectively [12]. In our analytic simulation, we let τ0 = 0.5
sec for the road with PBVs and τ0 = 0.4 for the road
with CBVs. we evaluate the SDC(10,2,100). Noted that if the
lowest speed limit V is not put in the definition, the SDC
becomes meaningless since the capacity achieve maximum if
all the vehicles stop. From Fig. 3, we can see that even some
minute perception inaccuracies could lead to huge differences
in the safe longitudinal distance and thus SDC. Fig. 4 shows
the effect on SDC from various values of η under different
inaccuracies of eτ , ebrake and eV . Each η here features a
specific kind of V2V communication. The latency η of DSRC
and 5G in V2V applications are supposed to be shorter than
the value we adopt [13]. The machine response time τ0 we use
here lies in the range of [400, 500] ms. This is the around 13
the time needed for an inattentive driver and 12 of an attentive
driver [14]. If we compare Figure. 3 with Figure. 4, we can
conclude that even some inaccuracy metrics have little impact
on the SDC, Their effects become ineligible when all of them
are considered.
V. OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we intentionally simplify some of the analysis,
especially the parts that are supposed to be probabilistic
instead of deterministic due to the stochastic nature of both en-
route drivings and inter-vehicle communications. The scenar-
ios we presumed in Section II might also be too ideal from the
perspective of the real-world situation. The SDC we obtained
is the one without any concept of platooning but focus on the
result of individual car behaviors. Training a self-driving car is
itself a challenging problem but we choose to ignore this issue
and presume the vehicles are capable of driving perfectly like
an adrift human driver. For the convenience of deterministic
analysis, we let the road to be intersection-free and straight.
However, the case with intersections and roads that are not
straight might generalize the SDT and the SDC. We leave them
as our future work. Another thing worth mentioning is that the
concept of SDT and SDC may also apply to human drivers or
the heterogeneous situation that consists of man-drive vehicles
and self-driving vehicles with just minor modifications. This
fact makes our work even more practical.
TABLE I: Variables in Section III
Variable (unit) Description
(σ, i) |= φ φ(σ(i)) is true
(σ, i) |= G[a,b]φ ∀j ∈ [i+ a, i+ b], (σ, j) |= φ
(σ, i) |= F[a,b]φ ∃j ∈ [i+ a, i+ b], (σ, j) |= φ
(σ, i) |= φ ∧ ψ (σ, i) |= φ ∧ (σ, i) |= ψ
(σ, i) |= φ ∨ ψ (σ, i) |= φ ∨ (σ, i) |= ψ
DLongitudinal−safe (m) The minimum safe longitudinal distance
τ(η) (sec) Response time for rear car
Vr (m/s) Speed of rear car
Vf (m/s) Speed of front car
amaxbrake (m/s
2) The deceleration of full braking power
amaxacc (m/s2) Max acceleration of a car
L (m) Length of vehicle, we suppose all the same.
Tr (sec) The time rear car need to enter a full stop
Tf (sec) The time front car need to enter a full stop
Vr τ(η) max (m/sec) Maximum possible Vr after τ(η) sec
Dcorrected (m) The corrected minimum safe longitudinal distance
τC (sec) Corrected Response time
VfC (m/s) Corrected Speed of front car
eL Inaccuracy of sensors measuring L
eVf Inaccuracy of sensors measuring Vf
ebrake Inaccuracy of sensors measuring amaxbrake
eτC Inaccuracy of sensors measuring τ
amaxbrakeC (m/s
2) Corrected max deceleration of front car
LC(m) Corrected length of vehicle
TrC (sec) Corrected time rear car need to enter a full stop
TfC (sec) Corrected time front car need to enter a full stop
Vr τ maxC (m/s) Corrected maximum possible Vr after τC + η sec
η (sec) Random variable of the latency between CBVs
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